January 21st, 2009 nk
On January 18, 2009, Israel declared a unilateral ceasefire in Gaza.
During the last several days of the ground operation the local Hamas leadership (hidden in a bunker under the Shita hospital in Gaza) figured that they were doomed. All their preparations to meet the Israeli ground forces and “bleed them to death” were in vain. Israeli casualties were low, while Hamas suffered heavy losses. They also reasoned that if the destruction went on for much longer not only would they lose militarily but the political support they had with the population would be gone as well. It may be gone anyway, but right now it doesn’t matter.
Hamas has a divided command structure. There is the government in Gaza, with a Prime Minister (Hiniya) and a bunch of other ministers and functionaries. There is also a command structure in Damascus, the Hamas “Politburo” headed by Haled Mashaal.
The Gaza contingent sent a delegation to Egypt to try for a negotiated ceasefire. The Egyptians presented a take it or leave it proposal: both Hamas and Israel declare a cease fire, Hamas stops shooting rockets and Israel retreats from Gaza. The border crossing at Rafah (Gaza – Egypt) will return to Palestinian Authority control under EU supervision. Smuggling through the Egyptian border stops.
Hamas Gaza asked for time to confer with their Damascus leadership. In the meantime Egypt presented the same proposal to the French and to Israel.
Hamas Damascus wasn’t in a hurry to agree – they didn’t feel the pain their colleagues in Gaza did. Hamas came back to the Egyptians with terms: Israel will promise to open the border crossings and stop blockading Gaza and Hamas will have control over the Rafah crossing.
The Egyptin response: we meant what we said – take it or leave it. Israel more or less accepted the Egyptian proposal – it wanted to insure that effective measures will be taken to stop weapons smuggling.
After two more days of Israeli military pressure Hamas Gaza agreed to declare an unconditional cease fire. Hamas Damascus approved the decision the next day. It was obvious from the speeches of Hania (recorded in a bunker in Gaza) and several of the Damascus contingent that Hania accepted defeat whereas the Damascus leadership was still looking for a face-saving maneuver.
Then Israel suddenly declared a unilateral cease fire.
The officially given reasoning for this ceasefire was as following:
- Israel will not recognize Hamas and will not negotiate with it.
- The damage to Hamas was extensive and enough to teach the organization a lesson.
- Israel and the U.S. signed a Memorandum Of Understanding to prevent smuggling of weapons into Gaza.
- Negotiations with Egypt and other countries will continue to prevent further smuggling.
So much for the official position.
The official Israeli reasoning makes no sense:
- At no time were they negotiating with Hamas and therefore any agreement would not have been a recognition of Hamas. Any agreements would have been between Hamas and Egypt and Israel and Egypt.
- Some analysts, notably Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, claim that Israel didn’t have to destroy Hamas, which, in his and others’ opinion, was impossible anyway. Friedman brings Lebanon and Hizbulla as an example. Hizbulla declared victory in the 2006 Lebanon war and the Israeli press and public agreed. Since then Hizbulla rearmed, courtesy of Syria and Iran, but keeps the peace. Apparently they learned their lesson and want no more wars with Israel. Friedman concludes that the same is true for Hamas. The problem with this reasoning is the fundamental difference between Hizbullah and Hamas.
Hizbullah represents a minority Shiite group in Lebanon. The Sunnis, Druze and Christians were seriously upset by the war Hizbullah started. It was clear to the Hizbullah leadership that starting another engagement with Israel would cost them dearly on the home front. So they are quiet.
Hizbullah being based in Lebanon and having an open border with Syria has a strategic depth Hamas doesn’t enjoy and hence is more difficult to defeat.
As opposed to Hizbullah, Hamas has no strategic depth. Their main and only base is in Gaza. Israel controls most of the borders and the approach by sea. Only a short border with Egypt gives the organization access to weapons and money.
Hamas was always much more aggressive than Hizbullah. They perfected the culture of death where children are taught from birth that there is nothing better or more noble that to die while killing Jews.
Hamas’ reason for existence is the destruction of Israel. So expect a renewal of rockets and mortar attacks on Israeli towns as soon as Hamas licks it wounds. As a matter of fact, today, as the Israeli troops are on their way out of Gaza, Hamas already fired a number of mortars. Just to show that they won.
As far as lessons go, Hamas was taught two: The first one was tough: the Israeli armed forces have rebuild themselves after the Lebanon war in 2006 and Hamas is no match for them. The organization was severely damaged both militarily and politically. The second lesson was: the Israeli politicians are exactly the same as during the Lebanon war (except for the Minister of Defense who is from the same party) and committed exactly the same follies, rescuing Hamas at the last possible moment.
- The MOU with the U.S. is meaningless – it states that the U.S. will do its best to assist in the cessation of smuggling. Since the weapons in question are not smuggled through U.S. territory the statement obligates the U.S. to nothing.
- As to continuig negotiations with Egypt and others: these were going on for years and produced no results. Now that the fighting is over they will continue. Likely with the same outcome as before. Israel will have to persuade Egypt to formally agree to prevent smuggling of weapons (somewhat futile as such an agreement is in place already but not enforced by Egypt). Israel will also need to persuade other nations to help with supervision of the Egyptian-Gaza border to prevent tunnel digging (help Egypt is not happy to accept). Since weapons to Gaza come mostly from Iran through a complicated land/sea route they can be stopped on the way. This will require an international effort with questionable chances of success. These negotiation are stalled and will likely remain so, especially as there is no fighting and it’s not urgent to do anything.
Israel could, if its political leadership was wiser and braver, destroy Hamas in this operation. With its leadership captured (which was only days away as Israeli troops approached the hospital and bunker underneath it) and most of the military might gone, Hamas would be unable to govern Gaza. At that point Israel would have to establish a civilian occupation government for a very short time. A couple of moths down the road the Palestinian Authority would be ready to take over and pay back Hamas for the murder and torture of the Fatah operatives in Gaza.
Obviously the current Israeli government decided to take the easy way out. If they continued their negotiations with Egypt, a ceasefire would have been declared eventually. But in the four or five days it would have taken, Israel could brake Hamas. Apparently Israel didn’t want to deal with the aftermath of a victory.
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